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Summary
The Two Phase Commit (2PC) protocol has long been known to have a provably
inevitable vulnerability to blocking or non-progress amidst server crashes, even
when the distributed database system guarantees the most demanding timing-related
or ‘synchrony’ requirements. Our aim here is to eliminate this vulnerability by
using a blockchain for coordinating 2PC execution. We present the impossibilities,
the possibilities, the cost and the trade-offs in this blockchain-based approach to
blocking-free management of distributed transactions. We prove that a non-blocking
and blockchain-coordinated 2PC protocol can exist only if both the blockchain
and distributed database systems meet synchrony requirements; otherwise, though
blocking remains eliminated, transactions can unnecessarily abort. We present a
blockchain coordinated 2PC protocol and provide rigorous arguments for its cor-
rectness under the synchrony requirements. We then implement this protocol on the
Ethereum Testnet and demonstrate, through our experiments, that the monetary cost
of executing smart contracts is quite small, the protocol performance slows down
when using a public blockchain like Ethereum and that even major violations of syn-
chrony requirements lead only to relatively small increases in unnecessary aborts.
We thus identify a trade-off between improving protocol performance and admitting
a risk that transactions could occassionally abort unnecessarily.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of Bitcoin in 20081, cryptocurrencies have gained considerable interest. This is then followed by an even larger
interest being accorded to Bitcoin’s underlying technology, the blockchain, and to Ethereum’s development of smart contracts
that empower users to execute custom-made programs on a blockchain? . A variety of applications outside the cryptocurrency
domain, such as finance2, banking and energy trade3, have been leveraging blockchain and smart contract technologies to
enhance accountability, auditability and trust in their core processes.
This paper investigates the use of these technologies in enhancing the availability of distributed database management sys-
tems4,5 and the associated cost. Precisely, we revisit a well-known impossibility result6,7 related to blocking in atomically
committing database transactions and demonstrate that these new technologies, under certain conditions, help accomplish what
would otherwise be impossible.
2When a database transaction is executed by multiple processes in a distributed system, an atomic commit protocol ensures
the essential requirement that all processes either commit the transaction or abort it - a requirement that is commonly known as
atomicity or agreement. The two phase commit protocol (2PC, for short) is widely used as an atomic commit protocol due to
its conceptual simplicity, ease of implementation and low message cost. It is however vulnerable to periods of non-progress or
blocking. This vulnerability is proven6 to be inevitable even in synchronous distributed systems where bounds on delays (e.g.,
message transfer delays) can be reliably estimated and the only type of undesirable events that can occur is process crash.
The definition of a ‘synchronous’ distributed system has long been established in the literature8. In our earlier work9, we
extended this definition for a blockchain system and developed a protocol in which the blockchain plays specific roles in the
execution of 2PC. This protocol was shown to eliminate blocking when both the distributed system and the blockchain used are
synchronous. Its design, however, required that the timestamps of blocks in a blockchain be increasing in value and that they
emulate ‘ticks’ of a global clock to database servers. While the Ethereum blockchain meets this requirement, other blockchain
systems do not and newly emerging ones may not. So, in this paper, we remove this requirement and present a new protocol
together with correctness arguments. This new version also eliminates blocking under synchronous constraints and retains the
native structure of 2PC for database processes which makes it easily adoptable in legacy systems.
To the best of our knowledge, our earlier paper9 is the first in the literature to demonstrate that the impossibility result of
Skeen6 can be circumvented in synchronous distributed systems by using a synchronous blockchain. This revised and extended
version not only improves on the earlier protocol but also addresses two significantly pertinent questions: can blocking be elimi-
nated if the blockchain or the distributed system is not synchronous, and, if the answer is no, what are the practical implications
if the blockchain and the distributed system can be synchronous most of the times, but not always?
Some blockchain systems, typically the public ones with miners having the freedom of choice in composing their blocks,
may cease to be synchronous if it becomes harder to accurately estimate delay bounds. Similarly, a cluster hosting distributed
database servers becomes asynchronous if accurate delay bound estimation within the cluster is not guaranteed.
We are thus faced with four possible combinations: (i) the blockchain is synchronous and the database cluster is asynchronous,
(ii) blockchain is asynchronous and cluster is synchronous, (iii) both are asynchronous, and (iv) both are synchronous. 2PC
blocking is eliminated for case (iv) as our protocol would demonstrate. Still to be addressed, therefore, is the question of whether
2PC blocking can be eliminated for other three cases.
We argued in9 that elimination of 2PC blocking cannot be guaranteed for (iii). We prove here that the same impossibility
holds for more restricted cases of (i) and (ii) as well. Thus, the impossibility results presented here are stronger than that shown
in9 and point to quite a fundamental result: a non-blocking 2PC using a blockchain is possible if and only if both the blockchain
and the database cluster are synchronous. That is, many desirable features that a blockchain system has, such as reliability,
immutability, etc., are not by themselves sufficient to eliminate 2PC blocking, and synchrony is required additionally.
Finally, when the blockchain and the distributed system are considered to be synchronous, even carefully computed delay-
bound estimates are at risk of being violated, e.g., due to bursts in network traffic. We argue that such violations can cause
some commit-worthy database transactions to abort unnecessarily, but cannot undermine the core atomicity requirement that
all servers either commit or abort. We investigate the relation between the number of unwarranted aborts and the degree of
violations in the synchronous assumption, and observe that the former is small even when the latter is large.
In summary, this paper explores and exposes the impossibilities, the possibilities, the cost and the trade-offs involved in using
a blockchain to implement non-blocking atomic commit. Its structure and contributions are as follows. The next section presents
the atomic commit problem that 2PC solves, the notion of blocking and the distinction between synchronous versus asynchronous
distributed systems. Assuming a synchronous system, Section 3 describes the traditional version of 2PC and explains the causes
of 2PC blocking. It thus provides the essential background for Section 4 which describes in detail our first contribution that
is in the domain of protocol design: a non-blocking 2PC with a synchronous blockchain, together with pseudo-code for smart
contracts and correctness arguments. Section 5 presents our second, conceptual contribution: the impossibility results that prove
that non-blocking 2PC is not possible when either the blockchain or the distributed system is asynchronous, and the observation
that synchrony violations in a blockchain coordinated 2PC have no impact on non-blocking atomic commit except for potential
to cause unwarranted aborts. Our practical contributions are detailed in Section 6 which describes an Ethereum Testnet based
implementation of the protocol of Section 5 and discusses the results of our experiments. The discussions present the cost of smart
contract execution, report both the estimated and observed worst-case 2PC execution latency values, quantify the probability
of occurrence of unwarranted aborts caused by synchrony violations and point out the scope for trade-off between improving
performance and minimising wasteful aborts. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
32 THE ATOMIC COMMIT PROBLEM
The problem is specified in the context of a set of distributed processes Π = {푃1, 푃2,… , 푃푛}, where 푛 > 1 is known. A process
푃푖, 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛, can crash at any time and recover after some arbitrary amount of time. Information logged in the disk prior to
crash survives the crash. At any given instance, there are two complementary subsets of Π, the crashed and the operative. For
discussions, we would assume that the former is small and a strict subset of Π.
Each operative process autonomously evaluates a vote that can be either yes or no. The problem is to have processes decide
either on commit or abort, subject to the following four requirements10:
• Agreement: No two processes decide differently;
• Termination: All operative processes decide;
• Abort-Validity: Abort is the only possible decision if some process votes no or does not vote at all; and,
• Commit-Validity: Commit is the only possible decision if every process is operative and votes yes.
Agreement requires any two decided processes, currently crashed or operative, to have decided identically. Say, 푃푘 decides
on commit and immediately crashes; then no other process can decide on abort even if all but 푃푘 are operative and deduce 푃푘
to have crashed. Termination ensures that the decision be available to all working processes; in particular, if a process crashes
undecided, it should be able to decide when it becomes operative again, post-recovery.
Abort-Validity permits a process with no vote, not to exercise its vote at all. Commit-validity rules out trivial solutions such
as all processes perforce decide on abort irrespective of their votes. This last requirement, as we shall see in § 5, is impossible
to guarantee even in blockchain based solutions when the worst-case delay estimates being used are not guaranteed to hold.
Observe that any non-trivial solution to atomic commit requires operative processes of Π to interact amongst themselves -
either directly leading to decentralised protocols or via a protocol coordinator 퐶 leading to centralised versions. The former
extract a hugemessage cost. Thewidely-used 2-Phase Commit (2PC) protocol is a centralised one and is highlymessage efficient.
It would be our focus here. (In practice, the role of 퐶 is typically played by a designated process in Π.)
Definition. An atomic commit protocol is said to be blocking, if there can exist executions in which operative processes cannot
decide until some non-empty subset of crashed processes ought to recover6,11. Blocking is thus undesirable as the progress of
operative processes, normally larger in number, is dictated by the recovery times of crashed ones. A protocol is non-blocking
if operative processes are guaranteed to decide even if each crashed process is never to recover. Whether one can have a non-
blocking atomic commit protocol or not, depends on if the distributed system is synchronous or asynchronous7,10.
2.1 Synchronous vs Asynchronous Systems
Definition: A distributed system is said to be synchronous, if bounds on processing delays and inter-process communication
delays can be reliably estimated; otherwise, it is said to be asynchronous7,10.
Note that the bound estimates in a synchronous system can be large (typically, worst-case estimates) but must be finite and
hold reliably. Typically, distributed systems where delays can fluctuate arbitrarily and therefore reliable bound estimations are
not possible, are classed as asynchronous.
It is known that non-blocking atomic commit is not possible when the distributed database system is asynchronous7, unless
the system obliges every execution by behaving in certain desirable ways10. It is, however, possible to have a non-blocking
atomic commit in a synchronous system by using the message-expensive, decentralised approach12,13. Intuitively, the design
rationale in this approach is as follows. Reliable bound estimates in a synchronous system are used to implement perfect crash
detection using timeouts: a crash is always detected and an operative process is never mis-detected (no false positive/negative).
In addition, protocol performance is speeded up by assuming a bound on the maximum number of processes that can crash13.
Nevertheless, the centralised 2PC is a blocking protocol even in a synchronous system6, i.e., even when a cluster hosting Π
supports delay bounds to be estimated reliably and can thereby facilitate perfect crash detection!
2.2 Synchronous vs Asynchronous Blockchains
We observe that this synchronous vs asynchronous classification holds for blockchain based 21 systems9 as much as for tradi-
tional distributed systems. (Earlier definitions9 will be re-stated in § 4.2 for completeness.) In public blockchain systems, such
4as Ethereum, the time taken for a valid transaction to be confirmed or irreversibly placed in the blockchain is determined by a
variety of delay-prone factors - both human as well as system related; for instance, a miner being (un)willing to include a trans-
action in their block14 falls under the former category and factors such as the required number of follow-up blocks to assure
blockchain linearity and incoming transaction rate fall under the latter.
Ethereum blockchain confirmation time for a transaction can be unbounded with a significant probability14, suggesting large
variances in end-to-end processing delays within the blockchain infrastructure. On the other hand, permissioned blockchain
systems (e.g., HyperLedger15), with their hardened modular implementation of consensus protocols (e.g.,16) over dedicated
machines, appear to promise that the delays for transaction confirmation have small mean (in the order of milliseconds) and also
small variance and can, therefore, be reliably bounded, thus making such systems candidates for a synchronous blockchain.
3 2PC IN SYNCHRONOUS SYSTEMS
The 2-Phase Commit protocol, 2PC for short, is explained below in the context of database transactions5. Shards of a database
are distributed over processes in Π. We assume that a crash-prone process, called the coordinator and denoted as 퐶 , launches
a multi-shard transaction that requires every process in Π to execute a set of serialisable operations on their respective shards.
We refer to this launching by 퐶 as each process in Π getting_work from 퐶 .
Let휔 and 훿 denote upper bound estimates on the time any operative 푃푖 ∈ Π takes to complete its work and on message transfer
delays between any two operative processes, respectively. Since the system is assumed to be synchronous, 휔 and 훿 always hold.
PHASE 1
Coordinator C:
1. Broadcast cast_vote to all 푃1…푃푛
2. Set Timeout Δ = 2훿; go to Phase 2
푃푖:
1. IF (cast_vote not received until 푇푖 or 푉푖 = 0) THEN quit ELSE {Log 푉푖 = 1; send 푉푖 to 퐶; Set
timer; go to Phase 2}
PHASE 2
C on timeout Δ:
1. IF any absent 푉푖 THEN verdict = abort ELSE verdict = commit
2. Log verdict; Broadcast verdict to all 푃1…푃푛
푃푖:
1. Repeat on timer: IF verdict arrived THEN Log verdict ELSE {request 퐶; reset timer}
2. Until verdict logged
FIGURE 1 Two phase commit protocol
퐶 disseminates the work and awaits on a timeout of (휔 + 훿) duration which is sufficient for any operative 푃푖 to receive and
complete the work given to it. At the expiry of the timeout, it initiates an execution of 2PC by broadcasting cast_vote to all
processes - as shown in line 1, phase 1 for Coordinator C in Figure 1. This is then followed by setting a timer for Δ = 2훿 and
proceeding to phase 2. (Note: 퐶 waiting for (휔 + 훿) time before broadcasting cast_vote is not shown in Fig. 1.)
When 푃푖 receives work from 퐶 , it computes 푇푖 as the local time when a duration (휔 + 2훿) would elapse after the receipt of
the work. While doing the work, 푃푖 will either complete it and set its vote 푉푖 = 1 or decide that work cannot be completed in a
serialisable manner and set 푉푖 = 0. In the latter case, by the Abort-Validity property, 푃푖 can deduce that the decision or verdict
is abort i.e., the transaction would be aborted systemwide; so, 푃푖 quits executing 2PC as shown in line 1 of Phase 1 for 푃푖 in
Figure 1.
5Note that it is possible to have a 2PC implementation that makes 푃푖 send 푉푖 = 0 to 퐶; we consider such an implementation
only where relevant (Subsection 5.2), but otherwise we will assume the common (and message-optimal) case of 푃푖 with 푉푖 = 0
simply halting the execution with abort decision.
If 푃푖 has set 푉푖 = 1, it waits to receive cast_vote. If cast_vote message is not received until 푇푖, 푃푖 assumes that 퐶 has crashed,
decides abort and quits its execution of 2PC. If, on the other hand, cast_vote arrives by 푇푖, 푃푖 continues executing 2PC by
logging its vote 푉푖 = 1, sending 푉푖 to 퐶 and proceeding to Phase 2. That is, the ‘ELSE’ part in line 1 of Phase 1 for 푃푖 in Figure
1 is executed when (cast_vote not received until 푇푖 or 푉푖 = 0) is false which is equivalent to (cast_vote received before 푇푖 and
푉푖 = 1) becoming true.
Note that while a given 푃푖 may or may not enter phase 2, 퐶 always does. When its Δ-timout expires, 퐶 counts an absent vote
from any 푃푘 as 푉푘 = 0; it decides on commit verdict, if 푉푖 = 1,∀푖 ∶ 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛; on abort verdict, otherwise. The verdict decided
is logged and broadcast to all 푃푖. (See Phase 2 of Figure 1).
Any 푃푖 that executes phase 2, awaits verdict from 퐶 and requests 퐶 periodically (as per some timer value), if verdict is not
forthcoming. This periodic request will prompt a crashed 퐶 to respond after its recovery by referring to the verdict it logged
prior to the crash. If no verdict has been logged, 퐶 must have crashed prior to computing the verdict; in that case, 퐶’s response
would be abort.
Similarly, if 푃푖 crashes after sending 푉푖 = 1 to 퐶 , it will observe, after recovery, the log entry of 푉푖 = 1 and request 퐶 to send
the verdict. Thus, all operative processes, including those that crash during execution and recover, decide - ensuring termination.
It is easy to see that the other three requirements of atomic commit are also met in 2PC.
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−
FIGURE 2 2PC State Transition Diagram for Process 푃푖
Figure 2 depicts the state transition diagram for any 푃푖 where a circle denotes a state and a double circle a terminal state; a
state transition is indicated by an unidirectional arrow with a label 퐼
푂
where 퐼 indicates the input received by 푃푖 which causes
the transition and 푂 any output produced by 푃푖 after the transition. (’-’ indicates null output.)푊퐺,푊1 and푊2 represent states
where 푃푖 is doing the work given, waiting for 푐푎푠푡_푣표푡푒 (see line 1, phase 1 in Fig 1) and for verdict (line 1, phase 2 in Fig 1,
respectively; 푎 and 푐 denote the terminal states where 푃푖 aborts and commits, respectively.
3.1 Inevitability of Blocking in 2PC
While Skeen6 formally proves this inevitability, we offer here, for completeness, an intuitive understanding of the reasons for
it. By the definition of blocking (see Section 2), in every execution of a non-blocking 2PC protocol, operative processes decide
despite some processes crashing and staying crashed; i.e., operative processes reach a verdict that satisfies the atomic commit
requirements without having to wait for any crashed process to recover.
We present three distinct execution scenarios of 2PC and show that no mechanism can possibly exist that avoids blocking in
all scenarios and all meets all atomic commit requirements.
Scenario 1: In this execution of 2PC, every 푃푖 ∈ Π votes 푉푖 = 1 and 퐶 crashes just before it is to broadcast its verdict. 퐶
remains crashed, i.e., does not recover, for a long time.
6Each 푃푖 is blocked until 퐶 recovers. Suppose that blocking is avoided by using some repair sub-protocol  that enables
operative processes to decide on a verdict (here commit) without waiting for the crashed 퐶 to recover. For example,  may
require operative processes to interact among themselves on how they voted and to arrive at a verdict that퐶 would have broadcast
had it not crashed. Next two scenarios prove that cannot exist.
Scenario 2: It is identical to scenario 1 except that one 푃푘 ∈ Π could not complete its work, decides on abort and then
crashes. 푃푘 also remains crashed for a long time. must now enable all operative 푃푖, 푖 ≠ 푘, to decide on abort without waiting for 푃푘 or 퐶 to recover.
Scenario 3: It is also identical to scenario 1, except that 퐶 crashes after sending verdict = commit only to 푃푘 which crashes
soon after logging the received verdict. 푃푘, as in scenario 2, remains crashed for a long time. must now lead all operative 푃푖, 푖 ≠ 푘, to decide on commit without waiting for 푃푘 or 퐶 to recover.
We observe that the execution environments of scenarios 2 and 3 are identical for all operative 푃푖, 푖 ≠ 푘: both 퐶 and 푃푘
remain crashed until all 푃푖 decide on verdict; secondly, there is no interaction between 푃푘 and 퐶 in Scenario 2 after 퐶 broadcast
cast-vote and 푃푖 cannot deduce any of the pre-crash interactions between 푃푘 and 퐶 in Scenario 3 until one of the crashed ones
recovers. Thus, is expected to make all operative 푃푖 decide differently in identical execution environments. Such an cannot
be designed and hence 2PC blocking is inevitable.
Remarks. As per Skeen6, the root causes for the inevitability of 2PC blocking are two-fold: both terminal states, 푐 and 푎, are
one-step reachable from푊2 as can be seen in Fig 2, and (ii) it is possible to have an operative 푃푖 waiting in푊2 and a crashed 푃푘
either in 푎 (see scenario 2) or in 푐 (see scenario 3). In Skeen’s terminology, (ii) is referred to as the terminal states, 푐 and 푎, being
in the concurrency set of 푊2. Designing  involves modifying 2PC itself and introducing new pre-terminal ‘buffer’ states so
that both terminal states are not in the concurrency set of푊2. This 2PC modification leads to 3 phase commit and details are in6.
4 NON-BLOCKINGWITH BLOCKCHAIN
4.1 Approach
We can observe that if퐶 were never to crash during 2PC execution, then blocking cannot happen.We build on this observation by
having 퐶 initiate a transaction by delegating work to all 푃푖 and then entrust the 2PC coordination responsibilities to a blockchain
infrastructure (BC, for short) which, being a replicated state machine, must coordinate 2PC execution in a crash-free manner.
To accomplish this, several aspects of BC will be made use of and they are listed below.
Event ordering. Events directed at a BC are also called transactions. BC puts a total order on these events and records them in
that order; event recording is immutable and recorded events are permanently visible to all concerned parties. Event ordering
in BC can also be used to ensure exactly once execution of an action, say, 퐴 when multiple sources, e.g., processes in Π, can
request 퐴’s execution: BC can be programmed (see smart contract below) to accept only the first request for 퐴 in the total order
and ignore the duplicates.
Smart Contract. A smart contract is a computer program stored within, and run by, BC in response to a function call embedded
within an ordered transaction. Execution is guaranteed to be correct and is publicly verifiable. A smart contract has a unique
address and its code is stored within BC. The latter is structured as a collection of deterministic functions that can only be
invoked by transactions admitted into BC. In Ethereum (see next item), contract code is written in languages like Serpent, LLL
or Solidity17. Irrespective of the language used, the code is compiled into byte-code and interpreted by a BC component, such
as, Ethereum Virtual Machine.
Ethereum18. Ethereum is a popular platform that supports smart contract technology and is used in our implementation
described in Section 6 (or § 6 for brevity). A user process, such as퐶 , can deploy a smart contract in BC by launching a transaction
whose data field contains the byte-code of the smart contract with parameters appropriately initialised. Once this transaction is
accepted in BC, any named process, such as 푃푖, can invoke a contract function by submitting a transaction. The invoking trans-
action is constructed with (i) the receiver address pointing to the contract address and (ii) the parameter values for the function
call. In addition, in Ethereum, a transaction includes two more fields; GAS and GAS PRICE18. The miner who adds a block to
BC will use the GAS PRICE to convert the amount of GAS consumed into the Ethereum’s native currency called Ether. Thus,
the sender of an invoking transaction is charged for executing the contract.
74.2 Synchronous Blockchain
Similar to definitions of 휔 and 훿, let 훽 be the block construction bound on the delay that can elapse between the instant when
a user process 푈 launches a valid (blockchain) transaction 푇푋푈 and the instant when a block containing 푇푋푈 is (irreversibly)
added in BC; let 훼 be the awareness bound on the delay that can elapse between the instant when 푇푋푈 enters BC irreversibly
and the instant when any interested party gets aware of 푇푋푈 in BC. A BC infrastructure (together with miner/consensus nodes)
is said to be9 synchronous if it supports reliable estimation of bounds 훽 and 훼; otherwise, it is said to be asynchronous.
The assumption of a synchronous BC implies that several requirements have been met: a valid transaction submitted to BC
is never lost but is always considered for entry into the BC in a timely manner, a party interested in a given 푇푋푈 is periodically
scanning BC, etc. This is just like the validity of 훿 bound requiring that no message be lost but every message be queued,
transmitted, received and delivered - all in a timely manner.
4.3 2PC with Synchronous Blockchain
We explain here (i) how 퐶 hands over the coordination responsibilities for 2PC execution to the BC infrastructure and, (ii)
how 푃푖 interacts with BC to execute 2PC in two phases. Informally, 푃푖 uses Phase 1 to register its vote in BC and Phase 2 to
receive the verdict, very similar to the traditional 2PC execution. We also assume that the cluster hosting database processes
Π is synchronous as well. We do not however require processes of Π to directly detect each other’s crash (e.g., by operating a
failure detector). This is also the case in the traditional 2PC version.
4.3.1 Coordinator C
퐶 disseminates the work to each 푃푖 ∈ Π and, immediately after that dissemination, it enters Phase 1 to hand over the coordination
to BC infrastructure. On entering Phase 1, 퐶 launches a blockchain transaction 푇푋퐶 that sets up the 2PC coordination smart
contract in BC with initial state = VOTING.
Phase 1 for 퐶 ends with the launch of 푇푋퐶 and there is no Phase 2. Another major difference from the traditional 2PC is that
퐶 does not wait on any timeout between disseminating its work to Π and entering Phase 1. Note that 퐶 may crash during work
dissemination or after dissemination and before launching 푇푋퐶 .
Though Subsection 4.4 is devoted to explaining the smart contract in detail, the roles of two of its functions are briefly
explained here for ease of understanding: function 푉 푂푇퐸푅 enables 푃푖 to enter its vote in BC and also computes the verdict once
all 푃푖 ∈ Π have voted, and function 푉 퐸푅퐷퐼퐶푇 allows a 푃푖 to explicitly request for the verdict to be computed. Moreover, once
the smart contract computes the verdict, it changes the initial state to display the computed verdict, i.e., to COMMIT or ABORT.
4.3.2 Get-Work by 푃푖
When 푃푖 receives work from 퐶 , it records its current local clock time as 푇푖 and enters the ‘working’ state푊퐺 (see Figure 3). If
퐶 has indeed launched 푇푋퐶 , then 푇푋퐶 must enter BC no later than the local time 푇푖 + 훿 + 훽 and 푃푖 must observe 푇푋퐶 in BC
no later than its local time 푇푖 + 훿 + 훽 + 훼.
If 푃푖 cannot complete the work due to serializability constraints, it unilaterally decides on abort and terminates the execution.
This is shown by the state transition from푊퐺 to 푎 in Figure 3.
If, on the other hand, 푃푖 completes the work from퐶 , it enters Phase 1 by transiting from푊퐺 to the first wait state푊1 in Fig 3.
4.3.3 Phase 1 by 푃푖
푃푖 starts Phase 1 by looking for 푇푋퐶 in BC. If it does not observe 푇푋퐶 in BC until its clock has exceeded 푇푖 + 훼 + 훽 + 훿, it
deduces that 퐶 crashed before launching 푇푋퐶 and subsequently aborts as shown by the transition from푊1 to 푎 in Figure 3. 푃푖
awaiting 푇푋퐶 to appear in BC is similar to its waiting for cast_vote in Figure 1. Also, the transitions from state 푊퐺 in Fig 3
are identical to the traditional 2PC execution shown in Fig 2. (Transitions from푊퐺 are also called ‘off-chain’ activities19.)
If 푃푖 gets aware of 푇푋퐶 by local time 푇푖 + 훼 + 훽 + 훿, it logs 푇푖 first, followed by logging of 푉푖 = 1 (the latter as in Phase
1 of Fig 1). The logging order of 푇푖 and then 푉푖 is important for post-recovery execution by which 푃푖 can decide if it crashed
undecided after this point in 2PC execution. (Description in § 4.3.5.)
After logging 푇푖 and 푉푖, 푃푖 launches transaction 푇푋푖 with its vote 푉푖 = 1. It then enters Phase 2, with its state transiting from
푊1 to a second wait state푊2 in Fig. 3. Note that 푃푖 launching its 푇푋푖 must happen by its clock time 푇푖 + 푚푎푥{훼 + 훽 + 훿, 휔},
8where 푚푎푥{훼 + 훽 + 훿, 휔} is the larger of (훼 + 훽 + 훿) and 휔: 푃푖 must observe 푇푋퐶 in BC by clock time 푇푖 + 훼 + 훽 + 훿 and
complete its work by 푇푖 + 휔.
4.3.4 Phase 2 by 푃푖
When 푇푋푖 is accepted in BC, it invokes 푉 푂푇퐸푅 function of the smart contract with 푉푖 = 1 as input. Moreover, if all 푃푗 ∈ Π
launch 푇푋푗 , i.e., vote 푉푗 = 1, then the 푉 푂푇퐸푅 function would compute verdict = commit and display state = COMMIT when
the last 푉 = 1 is counted; otherwise, the state of BC will remain at the initial state = VOTING. (Details in § 4.4.)
Let Δ = 푚푎푥{훼 + 훽 + 훿, 휔} + 훼 + 훽 + 훿. 푃푖 in Phase 2 waits for BC state to change to state = COMMIT until its clock time
푇푖 + Δ. If 푃푖 observes BC state = COMMIT by then, it decides verdict = commit.
If 푃푖, on the other hand, still observes state = VOTING until its clock exceeds 푇푖 +Δ, this means that some 푃푘, 푘 ≠ 푖, did not
launch 푇푋푘. So, verdict must be abort. Though 푃푖 can now safely decide abort, our description here assumes that 푃푖 decides
on verdict = abort in response to such an indication from BC, just as in the traditional 2PC description where a 푃푖 that voted
푉푖 = 1 decides on abort by receiving verdict from 퐶 .
When BC state = VOTING and clock exceeds 푇푖+Δ, 푃푖 launches 푇푋푉푖 to invoke VERDICT function of the smart contract sothat verdict is computed in BC and displayed. In Fig. 3, 푃푖 does푊2 → 푊3 after launching 푇푋푉푖 , waits in푊3 until BC indicates
푠푡푎푡푒 = 퐴퐵푂푅푇 and then decides verdict = abort.
Waiting by 푃푖 in 푊3 must terminate as BC is reliable. It is likely that several other 푃푗 launch their own 푇푋푉푗 around aboutthe same time when 푃푖 launches 푇푋푉푖 . If so, only one will be effective in executing 푉 퐸푅퐷퐼퐶푇 (like 퐴 in § 4.1). Once BCindicates 푠푡푎푡푒 = 퐴퐵푂푅푇 , 푃푖 decides on abort and terminates the execution (푊3 to 푎 in Figure 3).
푊퐺
푊1
푊2 푊3
c
a
퐺푒푡−푊 표푟푘
−
푇푋퐶 ∈ 퐵퐶
푆푢푏푚푖푡{푇푋푖} 푡표 퐵퐶
푐푙표푐푘>(푇푖+훼+훽+훿)
−
퐶푎푛푛표푡 푐표푚푝푙푒푡푒−푐표푚푝푙푒푡푒푑
−
푐푙표푐푘>푇푖+Δ
푠푢푏푚푖푡{푇푋푉푖} 푡표 퐵퐶
퐵퐶.푠푡푎푡푒=퐶푂푀푀퐼푇
−
퐵퐶.푠푡푎푡푒=퐴퐵푂푅푇
−
FIGURE 3 State Diagram for 2PC with Blockchain
4.3.5 Post-Recovery Execution
It is possible that some 푃푘 ∈ Π crashes during the protocol execution. When it recovers, there are two possible cases: log of 푃푘
has or does not have entry 푉푘 = 1.
Absence of entry 푉푘 = 1 means that 푇푋푘 was never launched and any work done by 푃푘 has been erased from its (volatile)
memory during the crash. So, the recovered 푃푘 has no knowledge of the database transaction that triggered the 2PC execution. 푃푘
could, and hence would, do nothing regarding that database transaction; in other words, 푃푘 indirectly decides on abort. Further,
any 푃푖, 푖 ≠ 푘, that logged 푉푖 = 1 can also decide only on abort.
Suppose that the log of 푃푘 has the entry 푉푘 = 1. This means that 푃푘, prior to its crash, must have observed 푇푋퐶 in BC during
its pre-crash execution of Phase 1 and also logged the local time 푇푘 (see § 4.3.3). 푃푘 will resume executing 2PC starting from
Phase 2 (with its state in푊2) and get the verdict from BC.
Since 푇푘 is logged prior to logging 푉푘 = 1, the log that contains 푉푘 = 1 must have 푇푘 as well. If 푃푘 had crashed after logging
푇푘 but before 푉푘 (hence before launching 푇푋푘), then 푉푘 would not be found in the post crash execution and the entry 푇푘 without
a matching 푉푘 is simply deleted.
9Note that the post-recovery execution enables 푃푘 to decide even if 푃푘 is the only process in Π to have logged 푉푘 = 1 and
crashed before launching 푇푋푘, while all others transited from 푊퐺 to 푎: the recovered 푃푘 would then launch 푇푋푉푘 when itsclock > 푇푘 +Δ and BC would subsequently change its state from VOTING to ABORT. Note also that there is no assumption on
how long a crashed 푃푘 can take to recover.
4.4 Smart Contract Pseudo Code
Figure 4 presents the pseudo-code of 2PC coordination and the description here assumes that the contract is already deployed
on the blockchain with a unique address. The deployed contract is in the initial state 퐼푁퐼푇 and has two set variables: Σ and Σ푉
which are the set of participants eligible to vote and the set of those who actually voted, respectively; both the sets are initially
empty (when BC state = INIT). The smart contract has three functions:
• 푅퐸푄푈퐸푆푇 () invoked by 푇푋퐶 to initialise the contract,
• 푉 푂푇퐸푅() invoked by 푇푋푖 to register the vote of 푃푖 and to compute verdict once all 푃푖 ∈ Π voted, and
• 푉 퐸푅퐷퐼퐶푇 () invoked by 푇푋푉푖 to request the verdict to be computed, if not already done.
푇푋퐶 submitted by 퐶 contains Π and invokes 푅퐸푄푈퐸푆푇 function. This invocation succeeds only if 퐶 is asserted to have
ownership rights to invoke this function and the code is in the initial state INIT - as indicated in the Assert statement. If this
assertion succeeds, 푇푋퐶 is accepted and the state of the contract is changed to VOTING and Σ toΠ; otherwise, 푇푋퐶 is ignored.
Note that it is the feature of any blockchain that a transaction, such as 푇푋퐶 , is rejected if any of the pre-invocation assertions
fails. Throughout this description here, assertions are assumed to succeed, except for those 푇푋푉 that seek to invoke VERDICT
function not for the first time.
Having observed 푇푋퐶 in BC, a 푃푖 ∈ Π with vote 푉푖 = 1 launches its 푇푋푖. After asserting that state = VOTING, 푉푖 = 1 and
푃푖 ∈ Σ = Π, the contract records 푃푖 to have voted by adding it in Σ푉 . The BC state is changed to COMMIT when Σ푉 = Σ.
Any 푃푖 in 푊2 that finds state = VOTING even after its clock has read 푇푖 + Δ, invokes VERDICT function by submitting
푇푋푉푖 . The invocation succeeds only if 푃푖 ∈ Σ = Π and state = VOTING. If it succeeds, it sets state = ABORT. An attempt toredundantly invoke VERDICT when state = ABORT will not meet the latter condition and not succeed.
INIT: Set 푠푡푎푡푒 ∶= 퐼푁퐼푇 ; Σ ∶= [0푥000,… , 0푥000]; Σ푉 ∶= Σ;
REQUEST(): Upon 퐶 submitting 푇푋퐶 (Π) : Assert (푠푡푎푡푒 == 퐼푁퐼푇 and 푐푟푒푑푒푛푡푖푎푙푠 표푓 퐶) Set Σ ∶= Π; Set
푠푡푎푡푒 ∶= 푉 푂푇퐼푁퐺;
VOTER(): Upon 푃푖 submitting 푇푋푖 (푉 표푡푒): Assert (푠푡푎푡푒 == 푉 푂푇퐼푁퐺 and 푃푖 ∈ Σ); Assert (푃푖 ∉ Σ푉 );
Assert (푉 표푡푒 == 1); Set Σ푉 ∶= Σ푉 ∪ {푃푖}; 푖푓 (Σ푉 == Σ ) then Set 푠푡푎푡푒 ∶= 퐶푂푀푀퐼푇 ;
VERDICT(): Upon 푃푖 submitting 푇푋푉푖 : Assert (푠푡푎푡푒 == 푉 푂푇퐼푁퐺 and 푃푖 ∈ Σ); Set 푠푡푎푡푒 ∶= 퐴퐵푂푅푇 ;
FIGURE 4 Pseudo-code for 2PC coordination smart contract
4.5 Correctness Arguments
They are based on the assumption that BC and the cluster hosting Π are both synchronous, i.e., the bound estimates 훼, 훽, 훿 and
휔 - as defined in § 3 and § 4.2 - are reliable and are never violated at any point during an execution.
Lemma 1: If any 푃푖 that received work from 퐶 at local clock time 푇푖, does not observe 푇푋퐶 in BC until local clock exceeds
푇푖 + 훼 + 훽 + 훿, then 푇푋퐶 was never launched and would never enter BC.
Proof: 퐶 is to launch 푇푋퐶 immediately after it disseminates work toΠ. By the definition of 훿, work dissemination by 퐶 must
complete within 훿 time and the subsequent launching of 푇푋퐶 must occur at or before 푃푖’s clock time 푇푖 + 훿 even if the work
message had taken near-zero time to reach 푃푖, i.e., even if 퐶 started its dissemination just before 푃푖’s clock read 푇푖.
10
By the definitions of bound estimates 훽 and 훼, 푃푖 must observe 푇푋퐶 in BC at or before its clock time 푇푖 + 훼 + 훽 + 훿. If 푃푖
cannot observe 푇푋퐶 until its clock exceeds that time, then either 퐶 did not launch 푇푋퐶 or 퐶 launched 푇푋퐶 and some bound
estimate(s) got violated. When bound estimates are reliable and inviolable, the former ought to be the only underlying cause and
hence the lemma be correct.
Lemma 2: If any 푃푖 that launched 푇푋푖, does not observe BC state = COMMIT until its local clock = 푇푖 +Δ, then there must
be some 푃푗 that did not launch 푇푋푗 , where Δ = 푚푎푥{훼 + 훽 + 훿, 휔} + 훼 + 훽 + 훿 as defined in § 4.3.4.
Proof: Recall that 푃푖 launches its 푇푋푖 no later than its clock time 푇푖 + 푚푎푥{훼 + 훽 + 훿, 휔}, as noted in § 4.3.3. Suppose that
another 푃푗 ∈ Π, 푗 ≠ 푖, launches its 푇푋푗 at its clock time 푇푗 + 푚푎푥{훼 + 훽 + 훿, 휔}.
푃푗 receives its work from 퐶 at local time 푇푗 which can be as late as 푃푖’s clock time 푇푖 + 훿 because it is possible that 퐶’s work
message to 푃푖 took near-zero transmission delay while that to 푃푗 suffered a maximum delay of 훿. Thus, 푃푖 could expect 푃푗 to
launch its 푇푋푗 no later than its clock time 푇푖 +푚푎푥{훼 + 훽 + 훿, 휔} + 훿. This means that 푇푋푗 must enter BC and its vote 푉푗 = 1
be counted no later than 푃푖’s clock time 푇푖 + 푚푎푥{훼 + 훽 + 훿, 휔} + 훿 + 훽.
Therefore, if every other 푃푗 ∈ Π had launched its 푇푋푗 , BC must have state = COMMIT no later than 푃푖’s clock time
푇푖+푚푎푥{훼+훽+훿, 휔}+훿+훽 and푃푖must get aware of this newBC state no later than its clock time 푇푖+푚푎푥{훼+훽+훿, 휔}+훿+훽+훼.
If 푃푖 observes BC in its initial state = voting when its clock exceeds 푇푖 + Δ, then some 푃푗 did not launch 푇푋푗 . So, the lemma
is proved.
Corollary: If 푃푖 launches 푇푋푉푖 when its clock exceeds 푇푖+Δ, there cannot be any 푇푋푗 from some 푃푗 ∈ Π that is yet to enterBC.
Follows from Lemma 2.
4.5.1 Agreement
Lemma 3. In any execution, Agreement requirement is met: no two processes decide differently.
Proof: Consider 푃푖, 푃푗 ∈ Π and 푗 ≠ 푖. Suppose that they both decide. Without loss of generality, we will choose 푃푖 to consider
how it could decide on some verdict ∈ {푐표푚푚푖푡, 푎푏표푟푡} and argue that 푃푗 cannot decide differently. 푃푖 can decide in four ways:
1. 푃푖 decides by observing BC state ≠ VOTING: Once BC state changes to COMMIT from VOTING, no 푇푋푉 , if ever any
launched, can reset state = ABORT because the assertion state = VOTING inVERDICT function is not true. Similarly, once
BC state changes to ABORT from VOTING, no 푇푋푖, if any launched, can reset state = COMMIT because the assertion
state = VOTING in VOTER function is not true. Thus, if 푃푗 also decides on a verdict by observing BC state ≠ VOTING,
it cannot decide differently to 푃푖.
2. 푃푖 decides by transiting푊퐺 to 푎: 푃푖 decides verdict = abortwithout ever launching 푇푋푖. Assuming that퐶 launches 푇푋퐶 ,
the boolean condition (Σ푉 == Σ) in VOTER function will not become true and BC state = COMMIT cannot happen. If 푃푗
does not take the transition푊퐺 to 푎 (as 푃푖) but goes on to launch 푇푋푗 , it cannot decide differently as verdict = commit
when BC state ≠ VOTING.
3. 푃푖 decides by observing 푇푋퐶 ∉ BC when clock > 푇푖 + 훼 + 훽 + 훿: By lemma 1, 푇푋퐶 was never launched and hence 푃푗
would also observe 푇푋퐶 ∉ BC. Both identically decide on abort.
4. Crashed 푃푖 executes post-recovery: Say, its log has no entry for 푉푖. So, prior to crash, 푃푖 may have decided on verdict =
abort by modes (2) and (3) above; otherwise, it decides indirectly on abort during its post-recovery execution as explained
in § 4.3.5. From 푃푗’s perspective, 푃푖 deciding indirectly is the same as 푃푖 deciding by mode (2) in its crash free execution
if 푃푗 observes 푇푋퐶 in BC or by mode (3) otherwise. If the recovered 푃푖 finds a log entry 푉푖 = 1, then it decides by mode
(1). Thus, 푃푗 cannot decide differently to 푃푖.
Thus, given that 푃푖 and 푃푗 , 푖 ≠ 푗, decide, they cannot decide differently.
4.5.2 Termination & Non-blocking
Termination requires that all operative processes decide. An operative process also refers to the one that recovers after a crash.
This requirement is met for any 푃푖 that executes the protocol without crashing: it decides either (i) at the expiry of timeout
(훼+훽 + 훿) based on its local clock or (ii) when BC changes from state = VOTING. Since BC is reliable, when 푃푖 launches 푇푋푉푖after its clock time 푇푖 + Δ, BC state is guaranteed to change to state ≠ VOTING if it has not already.
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Consider a 푃푘 that crashes without deciding. After recovery, it either decides indirectly on abort or decide by (ii) above. Thus,
every operative process in Π decides.
Further, neither (i) nor (ii) above requires an operative process to wait until another crashed process in Π or crashed 퐶 to
recover. So, the protocol is non-blocking.
4.5.3 Commit-Validity
Lemma 4. In any execution, commit-validity requirement is met: commit is the only possible decision if every process is operative
and votes yes.
Proof: By given, every 푃푖 logs 푉푖 = 1 and votes by launching 푇푋푖. So, 퐶 must have launched 푇푋퐶 and the smart contract
must have been initialised. The only way BC state can be changed from VOTING to ABORT is to have some 푇푋푉푖 enter BC andexecute the VOTER function before some 푇푋푗 can enter BC. By the corollary above, this cannot happen. Thus, BC state can
change only to COMMIT. Any 푃푖 that launches 푇푋푖 can decide only by observing BC state ≠ VOTING. So, commit is the only
possible decision.
4.5.4 Abort-Validity
Abort-validity requires that abort be the only possible decision if some process votes no or does not vote at all.
We have shown that all operative processes inΠ decide in an execution, including those that crash and recover. In our protocol,
a process 푃푗 ∈ Π either votes yes by launching 푇푋푗 with 푉푗 = 1 or does not vote at all by never launching 푇푋푗 . When 푃푗 does
not launch 푇푋푗 , the boolean condition (Σ푉 == Σ) in VOTER function cannot become true and BC state = COMMIT cannot
happen. Also, in our protocol, decision can be either commit or abort and an operative 푃푖 can decide commit only by observing
BC state = COMMIT. So, every operative 푃푖 can decide only abort when some 푃푗 does not vote at all.
Putting these arguments together, we can claim: our 2PC protocol with BC meets all four requirements of the atomic commit
problem (Section 2) and is also non-blocking.
5 ASYNCHRONY & IMPOSSIBILITIES
When bounds 훼 and 훽 cannot be reliably estimated, BC becomes asynchronous (see Subsection 4.2); similarly, when estimates
of bounds 훿 and 휔 are not guaranteed to hold, the cluster hosting Π becomes asynchronous (Subsection 2.1).
Note that a public BC can be asynchronous even if the underlying distributed system is synchronous. For example, if miners,
at the time of 푇푋퐶 launch, also encounter several other transactions that are more financially attractive to work on compared
to 푇푋퐶 , then 푇푋퐶 could take longer to enter BC, if at all, than any 훽 estimated in more favourable environments14. Similarly,
BC can be synchronous while the underlying distributed system is asynchronous. Thus, from the synchrony requirements per-
spective, our system is made up of two distinct sub-systems: BC and database cluster. This leads to three pertinent questions:
can we have a non-blocking 2PC in which the coordinator 퐶 offloads its coordinating responsibilities to a BC, when
1. the BC being used is synchronous and the cluster hosting Π is asynchronous?
2. the BC is asynchronous and the cluster is synchronous?
3. both the BC and the cluster are asynchronous?
Our earlier paper9 answered question (3) in the negative but left (1) and (2) open. Further, we also hinted in9 that it may
be possible to have a non-blocking 2PC for (2) because processes of Π in (2) are endowed with an advantage of being able to
accurately detect their crashed counterparts (i.e., perfect failure detection).
We formally answer these open questions here and show that non-blocking 2PC is not possible in cases (1) and (2) as well.
It turns out that the perfect failure detection capability within Π when cluster is synchronous, is not enough to construct a
non-blocking 2PC if BC is asynchronous; our optimistic hint expressed in9 for case (2) is misplaced.
We next present the impossibility proofs. Our approach is to prove by contradiction which involves three steps: we will (i)
hypothesize the opposite of the impossibility, i.e., suppose the existence of some correct non-blocking 2PC protocol, say,  that
meets all four requirements of atomic commit in every possible execution scenario, (ii) construct two execution scenarios that
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are indistinguishable from the perspective of any operative 푃푖 ∈ Π, and (iii) show that if  is correct in one scenario, it cannot
be so in the other. This contradiction will demonstrate that no such  can exist and thus prove the impossibility.
The two execution scenerios we construct will have the following features in common:
• 퐶 never crashes and the bound estimates used in  hold for all messages/requests sent by 퐶;
• Every process 푃푖 ∈ Π − {푃푘} is operative and wishes to commit by submitting ‘yes’ vote, 푉푖 = 1; and,
• 푇푖 denotes the local clock time when an operative 푃푖 receives ‘work’ from 퐶 .
Note that asynchrony in BC or cluster does not mean that the bound estimates used in  are always violated; they can be met
on many an occasion. Hence, the first feature is a possibility that is assumed to hold in the chosen execution scenarios. It ensures
that both executions have 퐶 offloading its coordination responsibilities in a timely manner and every operative 푃푖 observing
푇푋퐶 in BC also in a timely manner. The second feature leads to 푃푖 launching 푇푋푖 with 푉푖 = 1, when it observes 푇푋퐶 in BC.
5.1 Synchronous BC, Asynchronous Cluster
Let us first observe that the cluster is asynchronous, i.e., with 훿 and 휔 being likely to be violated. Crash detection is typically
done by periodically querying another process with ‘are you alive’ pings and awaiting respones to be received witin a set timeout
duration. It cannot therefore be guaranteed to be perfect: an operative process may be seen, at least temporarily, to have crashed
and it may take several non-responsive pings, and hence a long time, to affimatively conclude that a process has indeed crashed.
Impossibility 1. It is not possible to have a non-blocking 2PC protocol where the coordinator 퐶 offloads its coordinating
responsibilities to a BC, when that BC is synchronous and the cluster hosting Π = {푃1, 푃2,… , 푃푛} is asynchronous.
Proof (by contradiction). Let us hypothesise that the impossibility 1 is wrong and that there exists a non-blocking 2PC
protocol  . Consider two executions of  which have the common features mentioned earlier:
Execution 1: 푃푘 does 푊퐺 → 푎 and then crashes. All other 푃푖 are operative, wish to commit and launch 푇푋푖. Since  is
presumed to solve atomic commit, each 푃푖, 푖 ≠ 푘, must decide eventually, in this case on abort; say, 푃푖 decides at its local time
푇푖 +푖 in this execution, for some (finite) 푖. Further, 푃푘 does not recover in this execution until after every operative process
has decided, i.e., until the local time of every 푃푖 reads or exceeds 푇푖 +푖.
Execution 2: Every process of Π and 퐶 start the execution at the same time as in Execution 1. Also, every 푃푖, 푖 ≠ 푘, sends and
receives the same set of messages (including ping and ping-response messages) from each other until decision as in Execution
1 and each such message is sent or received at the same local clock time as well. That is, the behaviour of every undecided 푃푖
towards every other undecided 푃푗 , 푗 ≠ 푘, is identical in both executions.
푃푘 does not crash but observes 푇푋퐶 by its clock time 푇푘 + 훼 + 훽 + 훿 (due to the first common feature) and also completes
its work. However, the bound estimate 휔 is violated so much and launching of its 푇푋푘 (with 푉푘 = 1) so delayed that 푇푋푘 does
not enter BC until after the clock of every 푃푖, 푖 ≠ 푘, reads or exceeds 푇푖 +푖. Moreover, every message sent by 푃푘 (including
푃푘’s response to ping) is delayed arbitrarily such that it does not reach its destination until after the clock of every 푃푖 reads or
exceeds 푇푖 +푖. This is possible because the cluster, of which 푃푘 is a part, is asynchronous.
Execution 2 is indistinguishable from Execution 1 for any 푃푖, 푖 ≠ 푘, until its clock time 푇푖 + 푖. In the former, 푃푘 appears
non-responsive to any 푃푖 until 푇푖 +푖, while it remains crashed until 푇푖 +푖 in the latter. So, as in Execution 1, 푃푖 must decide
on abort at 푇푖 + 푖. This violates the commit-validity requirement: if no process crashes and all vote ‘yes’, decision ought be
commit. (See Section 2.) Thus, the hypothesis is contradicted and the impossibility proved.
Remarks: Proof makes no assumption on whether transmission delays of messages exchanged between any 푃푖, 푃푗 ∈ Π−{푃푘},
adhered to or violated the bound estimate 훿. It is only assumed that the delay experienced by a given message is identical in both
executions, which is a possibility that cannot be ruled out. Since  is supposed to work for an asynchronous cluster, there must
be a finite 푖 for every 푃푖, 푖 ≠ 푘 in Execution 1. Messages from 푃푘 taking longer than 푖 to reach 푃푖 in Execution 2 is another
possibility in an asynchronous cluster which is also assumed. Thus, Execution 2 is a feasible execution scenario for  .
5.2 Asynchronous BC, Synchronous Cluster
Since the cluster is synchronous, bound estimates 훿 and 휔 remain inviolable. Therefore, a pinging process can affirm that a
pinged process is operative or crashed if the latter does or does not respond within 2훿 time respectively; neither false-positives
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nor false-negatives are possible. Availability of this perfect failure detection capability is taken into consideration in constructing
the impossibility proof below.
Impossibility 2. It is not possible to have a non-blocking 2PC protocol where the coordinator 퐶 offloads its coordinating
responsibilities to a BC, when that BC is asynchronous and the cluster hosting Π = {푃1, 푃2,… , 푃푛} is synchronous.
Proof (by contradiction).
Let us hypothesise that the impossibility 2 is wrong and that there exists a non-blocking 2PC protocol  for asynchronous
BC and synchronous cluster. Consider two executions of  which have all the common features mentioned earlier.
Execution 1: 푃푘 remains operative, does푊퐺 → 푎, decides on abort and quits the execution without ever submitting 푇푋푘 to
BC. All other 푃푖 also remain operative but wish to commit and launch 푇푋푖. Since  is presumed to solve atomic commit, each
푃푖, 푖 ≠ 푘, must also decide on abort eventually; say, every 푃푖 decides on abort at its local time 푇푖 + 푖 in this execution, for
some (finite) 푖.
Execution 2: Every process of Π and 퐶 start the execution at the same time as in Execution 1. Also, every 푃푖, 푖 ≠ 푘, sends and
receives the same set of messages (including ping and ping-response messages) from each other until decision as in Execution 1
and each such message is sent or received at the same local clock time as well. That is, behaviour of every undecided 푃푖 towards
every other undecided 푃푗 , 푗 ≠ 푘, is identical in both executions.
푃푘 does not crash and, like every other operative 푃푖, 푖 ≠ 푘, launches its 푇푋푘. However, while every 푇푋푖 enters BC taking
the same delay as in Execution 1, 푇푋푘 enters BC after a delay that is the maximum in {푖 ∶ ∀푃푖 ∈ Π − {푃푘}}. Consequently,
푇푋푘 does not enter BC until after the local clock of every 푃푖 reads 푇푖 +푖. Note that 푇푋푘 taking longer than 훽 to enter BC is
possible since BC is asynchronous.
Execution 2 is indistinguishable for any 푃푖, 푖 ≠ 푘, from Execution 1 until its clock time 푇푖 + 푖. In the former, 푃푘 never
submits 푇푋푘, while, in the latter, 푇푋푘 does not appear in BC until after every 푃푖 decides. Moreover, in both executions, perfect
failure detectors of 푃푖 will report 푃푘 as an operative process. So, as in Execution 1, 푃푖 must decide on abort at 푇푖 + 푖. This
violates the commit-validity requirement: no process crashed and all voted yes. (See Section 2.) Thus, the hypothesis about  is
contradicted and the impossibility proved.
Remarks: We noted in Subsection 3 that some 2PC implementations force a process with ‘no’ vote to explicitly cast its vote.
In such an implementation, 푃푘 would launch a transaction 푇푋푘 with ‘no’ in Execution 1. In that case, this 푇푋푘 should be
considered to behave exactly like the 푇푋푘 in Execution 2: taking a delay that is the maximum in {푖 ∶ ∀푃푖 ∈ Π−{푃푘}} and not
entering BC until after the local clock of every 푃푖 reads 푇푖 +푖. Executions 1 and 2 are now indistinguishable for any 푃푖, 푖 ≠ 푘,
until its clock time 푇푖 +푖. So, the Impossibility 2 holds even in such uncommon implementations.
5.3 Implications of Synchrony Violations
A closer look at the impossibility proofs reveals that asynchrony in BC or in the cluster prevents only commit-validity from
being guaranteed i.e., abort could be decided when all processes of Π are operative and vote yes. This is also confirmed by the
correctness arguments in Subsection 4.5 which show that our 2PC protocol operating with BC solve the atomic commit problem
when both BC and cluster are synchronous. More precisely, these arguments indicate that if (i) 퐶 crashes without launching
푇푋퐶 , (ii) some 푃푘 crashes, or (iii) some 푃푖 votes no, the other three requirements are guaranteed to be met even when the
delay bound estimates are violated: arguments for termination (§ 4.5.2) and abort-validity (§ 4.5.4) do not refer to synchrony
assumptions at all; moreover, in cases (i) - (iii) above, verdict = abort is the correct outcome and verdict = commit cannot ever
be reached. So, the agreement is also met. In summary, synchrony is needed only to guarantee commit-validity.
Thus, when a bound estimate 푏 ∈ {훼, 훽, 훿, 휔} is violated, the only requirement that risks being compromised is commit-
validity, leading to unwarranted aborts of database transactions. Violations of 푏 can occur due to transient surges in computational
loads or network traffic or the traffic and/or loads having increased since the bound estimates were last computed.
At any given time, let 푏푎 be the actual prevailing value for an estimate 푏 ∈ {훼, 훽, 훿, 휔}. Synchrony is violated if 푏 < 푏푎 for
any 푏. This does not necessarily mean that the two timeouts used in the protocol would be violated. (Recall that (훼+훽+훿) is the
Phase 1 timeout defined in § 4.3.3 for deciding whether 푇푋퐶 would ever appear in BC, andΔ = 푚푎푥{(훼+훽+훿), 휔}+(훼+훽+훿)
is the Phase 2 timeout defined in § 4.3.4 before launching 푇푋푉 .)
For example, if only 훼 < 훼푎 and 푏 > 푏푎 for every other 푏, we can still have: 훼 + 훽 + 훿 ≥ 훼푎 + 훽푎 + 훿푎 and Δ ≥
푚푎푥{(훼푎 + 훽푎 + 훿푎), 휔푎} + (훼푎 + 훽푎 + 훿푎). Denoting Δ푎 = 푚푎푥{(훼푎 + 훽푎 + 훿푎), 휔푎} + (훼푎 + 훽푎 + 훿푎),
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let us define:
푚1 =
훼 + 훽 + 훿
훼푎 + 훽푎 + 훿푎
and 푚2 = ΔΔ푎 . (1)
Only when 푚1 < 1 or 푚2 < 1, Phase 1 or Phase 2 timeouts are at risk of becoming ‘too small’ respectively, leading to the
possibility of a transaction being unnecessarily aborted and the commit-validity not being upheld. As noted, (푚1 ≥ 1 ∧푚2 ≥ 1)
can still hold when only some bound estimates suffer minor violations. Using our protocol implementation described next, we
evaluate the likelihood of unwarranted abort occurrences when Phase 1 and Phase 2 timeouts aremade small by varying amounts.
6 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We implemented the 2PC-Blockchain contract from Figure 4 in Solidity 0.40.1117 and tested its operation on the Ethereum
Testnet network20, using Ethereum Wallet and Ethereum Mist21. Four different machines are used: (a) a MacBook Pro with
a 2.8 GHz Intel i5 CPU and 8 GB RAM, (b) three desktop PCs with a 3.20 GHz Intel i7 CPU and 8 GB RAM running on
Windows 10. The MacBook is the coordinator 퐶 and the three desktop PCs constitute the ‘cluster’ hosting 푃1, 푃2 and 푃3. Each
PC is connected to the Ethereum Testnet as a full node, thus having a full copy of the blockchain stored within it. The PCs do
not play the role of miners themselves and operate as non-mining database hosts connected to the blockchain. They are also
connected to each other and to switches by a standard switched Ethernet local area network, which connects through standard
TCP/IP with the Ethereum Testnet. The smart contract (see Figure 4) is also registered with the Ethereum Testnet.
6.1 Delay Bound Estimation
In all our experiments, the database transaction is kept null because our main objective is to assess the cost and performance
of coordination activities within and around the blockchain. Consequently, a ‘get-work’ message from 퐶 contains no work for
푃푖 but simply initiates the latter to execute 2PC which votes yes or no as per the purpose of a given experiment; so, the bound
estimate 휔 = 0. Other bounds 훼, 훽 and 훿 are established as follows.
The awareness delay (bounded by 훼) is calculated by taking the difference between the confirmation time of a given transaction
of interest (such as 푇푋퐶 or 푇푋푖) entering a block in BC and the time of receiving this block by each 푃푖. The confirmation time
is obtained from the Ethereum wallet, which shows the time that the block was added. The time stamps at the three 푃푖 nodes
give us three data points and the maximum of these three results is taken as one datapoint for estimating 훼. At the end of 30
experiments in which only 퐶 launched 푇푋퐶 , the maximum of the 30 data points obtained is taken as 훼.
The block entry delay (bounded by 훽) is calculated as the difference between the time stamp given to 푇푋퐶 at the coordinator
node when 푇푋퐶 is sent, and the confirmation time of the block that contains 푇푋퐶 within the blockchain. Similar to 훼 we take
the maximum of all data points obtained as 훽.
To obtain 훼 and 훽, each individual experiment consists of 퐶 submitting one single transaction 푇푋퐶 and ends once we have
collected all the data points. Each experiment takes several minutes, as we will see, and is repeated 30 times.
To measure data points for transmission delays (bounded by 훿), no 푃푖 needs to interact with the blockchain. We measure these
data points by letting 퐶 send a 1퐾퐵 Ethernet packet to each processor 푃푖 which then sends it back to 퐶 . We take the round trip
time and halve it to get one-way delays. The maximum of all data points collected is taken as 훿: we collected 30 round trip times
for each 푃푖, so 훿 is the maximum over 90 one-way delay estimates.
The results for 훼, 훽 and 훿 are shown in Figures 5, 6 and 7. In all three figures, the 푥-axis gives the experiment number (from
1 to 30), and the 푦-axis gives the point estimate of 훼, 훽 and 훿 (the max of the results in the three nodes, as explained above).
In estimating 훼, all experiments return values within the two-minute range. The highest observed value is for experiment 4,
at 115.734 seconds. Figure 5 shows only the maximum of the values for the three 푃푖, and we note that the difference between
the three obtained values in each of the 30 experiments is minimal, less than one second. For information, the average and the
median of the block awareness delays depicted in Fig 5 are 30.461 and 13.455 seconds, respectively.
In the experiments for 훽, the maximum is found in experiment 28, at a value of 118.800 seconds. Note that for some exper-
iments the transaction finds its way into a block in a matter of seconds, the minimum observed delay was 2.355 seconds. The
block entry delay is influenced by factors such as the transaction’s gas price which in turn influences miners’ decisions of which
transactions to include into the blocks they work on.
Figure 7 shows the results of our experiments for estimating 훿. They range from 1.590 seconds to 5.790 seconds.
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6.2 Cost of 2PC Coordination
As noted in Subsection 4.1, the initiator of a blockchain transaction that involves executing one or more functions of a smart
contract ought to pay the miner in the crypto currency ether that is commonly abbreviated as ETH. The payment is in proportion
to the amount of ‘gas’ (often written as GAS) consumed by the executions of functions a transaction invokes.
Furthermore, a transaction initiator can quote in the transaction the gas price they are willing to pay for executing the smart
contract functions. A higher gas price quoted can act as an incentive to miners in giving preferential treatment over those that
quote a lower gas price. In our experiments, the gas price quoted was the lowest possible; e.g., the Coordinator quotes the gas
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price of 0.001 ETH/million for executing the REQUEST function. By quoting only the lowest gas price, the cost in ETH we
report here would indicate the lower bound.
When a smart contract function involves repetitive executions conditional on Boolean statements (e.g., a while loop), the
gas cost can vary with the inputs supplied at invocations. As we can see from Figure 4, the 2PC coordination code does not
involve aspects that lead to input-dependent execution cost variations, except when the last 푃푖 ∈ Π casts its vote, the boolean
Σ푉 == Σ (which is checked on every invocation of VOTER()) comes true and ‘Set state = COMMIT’ is additionally executed.
This additional execution of a simple ‘Set’ statement does not incur any extra gas and it is confirmed in all our experiments.
The amount of gas that a miner uses when executing a given contract function is calculated by the Ethereum virtual machine
itself and is displayed in the Ethereum wallet at the initiator end. So, it is safer to assume that the reports on the amount of gas
expended for executing a given contract function are quite reliable. Table 1 provides the cost of executing each of three smart
contract functions: REQUEST(), VOTER() and VERDICT(). As per the prevailing exchange rates for ETH, the cost is in the
order of few US cents or British pence.
Transaction Reason GAS Used Cost in ETH
푇푋푐 By 퐶 to request voting 232736 0.000232736
푇푋푖 By 푃푖 to vote 84625 0.000084625
푇푋푣 By 푃푖 to seek verdict 55102 0.000055102
TABLE 1 Cost of executing 2PC-Blockchain contracts.
Table 2 presents the total cost for 2PC coordination in four possible voting scenarios when the number of 푃푖 in Π is three.
Scenarios GAS Used Cost in ETH
Three vote no 232736 0.000232736
Two vote no 372463 0.000372463
One votes no 457088 0.000457088
All vote yes 486611 0.000486611
TABLE 2 Total Cost in Various Voting Scenarios
When a 푃푖 votes no, it knows that the verdict = abort and terminates. Thus, when all three 푃푖 vote no, none will launch 푇푋푖
or 푇푋푉푖 . So, only REQUEST() function is executed and its gas price the total cost as shown in the row 1 of Table 2.In considering the remaining rows of Table 2, let us assume that neither a process crash nor any violation of the bound
estimates occurs during 2PC execution. If 푛′ processes, 푛′ = 1 or 2, vote no, (3 − 푛′) processes launch 푇푋푖 and, at the expiry of
Δ timeout, also 푇푋푉푖 of which only one will end up invoking VERDICT() function. Thus the total cost incurred is: the cost ofrow 1 + (3 − 푛′) × the cost of executing VOTER() function once + the gas cost of executing VERDICT() function once.
When all three processes vote yes, none will launch 푇푋푉푖 and the total cost is: the cost of row 1 + 3× the cost of executing
VOTER() function once. Generalising, when 푦 processes, 0 ≤ 푦 ≤ |Π|, vote yes, the total gas cost for 2PC coordination is:
gas cost of executing REQUEST() function once + 푦 × the gas cost of executing VOTER() function once + 푐 × the gas cost of
executing VERDICT() function once, where 푐 = 0 if 푦 = 0 ∨ 푦 = |Π|, and 푐 = 1 otherwise (i.e., 0 < 푦 < |Π|).
6.3 2PC Execution Latencies
2PC execution latency for an operative 푃푖 can be defined as the duration that can elapse from the moment when 푃푖 receives
‘work’ from coordinator 퐶 until the moment when 푃푖 decides either to commit or abort the transaction. Let the moments of
푃푖 receiving work and deciding be denoted as 푇푖 and 푇푖 + 퐸푖 respectively and be observed as per 푃푖’s local clock. Thus, 퐸푖 is
the 2PC execution latency for 푃푖. We will discuss 퐸푖 by first estimating the maximum value it can (theoretically) take and then
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reporting the actual maximum it took in our experiments, along with explanation for any wide discrepancy between the two.
Our estimation of latency bound will assume that the delay bound estimates used were conservatively arrived at by assigning
them to the largest data points observed (as described in § 6.1) and hence are safe, i.e., never violated.
6.3.1 Estimated Latency Bound
All possible execution scenarios need to be considered before arriving at the upper bound for 퐸푖. To start with, let us consider
the simplest case where 푃푖 takes the transition푊퐺 → 푎 (see Fig. 3); here, 퐸푖 cannot exceed 휔.
Alternatively, 푃푖 can vote yes instead of doing푊퐺 → 푎. In this execution scenario, two cases need to be considered: 푇푋퐶
does not or does enter BC. When 푇푋퐶 does not enter BC due to 퐶 crashing subsequent to disseminating the ‘work’, 푃푖 will
affirm the absence of 푇푋퐶 at the expiry of Phase 1 timeout and decide abort; so, 퐸푖 = Phase 1 timeout = 훼 + 훽 + 훿. In the
second case where 퐶 does not crash and 푇푋퐶 does enter BC, 퐸푖 will depend on the number, 푦, of processes in Π that vote yes.
Let 푦 = |Π|. Measuring time as per 푃푖’s clock, we note that 푃푖 would commence two parallel activities at 푇푖: doing the work
given to it and looking for 푇푋퐶 to appear in BC. The former must complete by 푇푖 + 휔 and 푇푋퐶 in BC would be known to 푃푖
by 푇푖 + Phase 1 timeout = 푇푖 + 훿 + 훽 + 훼, at the latest. Thus, at or before 푇푖 +푚푎푥{휔, (훼 + 훽 + 훿)}, 푃푖 must launch its 푇푋푖 and
all other 푃푗 must do so by 푃푖’s clock time 푇푖 + 푚푎푥{휔, (훼 + 훽 + 훿)} + 훿. Thus, the verdict computed at BC would be known to
푃푖 no later than its clock time 푇푖 + 푚푎푥{휔, (훼 + 훽 + 훿)} + (훼 + 훽 + 훿). So, 퐸푖 ≤ 푚푎푥{휔, (훼 + 훽 + 훿)} + (훼 + 훽 + 훿). Typically,
휔 is very small compared to (훼 + 훽 + 훿) and thus 퐸푖 ≤ 2(훼 + 훽 + 훿) when 푦 = |Π|.
Let 푦 < |Π|. (Since 푃푖 votes yes, 푦 > 0). 푃푖 would launch 푇푋푉푖 at its clock time 푇푖 +Δ and would observe BC state=ABORTno later than its clock time 푇푖 + Δ + 훽 + 훼. Thus, 퐸푖 ≤ Δ + 훼 + 훽. Given that Δ = 푚푎푥{(훼 + 훽 + 훿), 휔} + (훼 + 훽 + 훿) (defined
in § 4.3.4), 퐸푖 ≤ 2(훼 + 훽 + 훿) + (훼 + 훽) when 휔 is considered small compared to (훼 + 훽 + 훿).
Summarizing, 퐸푖 cannot exceed Δ + (훼 + 훽) = 2(훼 + 훽 + 훿) + (훼 + 훽) for an operative 푃푖 in any possible combination of
crashing and voting scenarios. Substituting the delay bound estimates, the (upper) bound for퐸푖 is 2(115.734+118.800+5.790)+
(115.734 + 118.800) = 715.182 seconds, i.e., 11 minutes and 55.182 seconds.
Finally, let us also estimate, for the sake of comparison, the bound for 퐸푖 when 2PC is executed without BC (as described in
§ 3). If 푃푖 suffers blocking due to crash of 퐶 , 퐸푖 can be arbitrarily long as 푃푖 cannot decide until 퐶 recovers. When 퐶 does not
crash, it turns out that 퐸푖 ≤ 휔+4훿: having received ‘work’ from 퐶 at its clock time 푇푖, 푃푖 can receive the broadcast cast_vote at
or before 푇푖 +휔+ 훿; 퐶 broadcasts the verdict after a 2훿 timeout expires following its broadcasting of cast_vote; 푃푖 must decide
by 푇푖 + 휔 + 훿 + 2훿 + 훿 if it voted yes. Thus, using 퐵퐶 to eliminate 2PC blocking results in a performance slow down when 퐶
does not crash and the slowdown is bounded by 3(훼 + 훽) − (휔 + 2훿) ≈ 3(훼 + 훽) = 703.611 seconds. Such a large slowdown
should be expected, given the features of public blockchains as discussed in Subsection 2.2 and also in14, and the need to use
safe delay bound estimates so that both BC and the cluster remain synchronous, i.e., synchrony violations do not occur.
6.3.2 Observed Latencies
We carried out 200 2PC executions using our implementation involving the Ethereum blockchain. We disallowed crashes and
ensured that the ‘work’ given by 퐶 is trivial to execute and all 푃푖, 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 3, always vote yes, i.e. 푦 = |Π|. Note that each
execution must result in all three processes deciding commit; otherwise, it would mean that Phase 1 or Phase 2 timeout became
‘too small’ in the prevailing execution environment and expired prematurely. In all 200 experiments, commit was indeed the
decision.
In each experiment, 푃푖 recorded the local clock times when it received the work, observed 푇푋퐶 in BC and decided as 푇푖,
푇푖 +퐷푖 and 푇푖 +퐸푖 respectively.퐷푖 and (퐸푖 −퐷푖) represent the latency for 푃푖 to execute only Phase 1 and Phase 2, respectively.
D1 D2 D3 E1 E2 E3 E1-D1 E2-D2 E3-D3
Min 00:09.421 00:42.872 00:20.412 00:08.332 00:42.335 00:20.203 00:07.964 00:41.904 00:20.328
Max 02:56.276 04:37.990 02:40.783 02:55.178 04:36.880 02:40.806 02:55.112 04:36.842 02:40.742
Avg 00:30.336 01:19.295 00:48.959 00:36.843 01:26.309 00:49.466 00:36.728 01:26.217 00:49.489
TABLE3Minimum (Min),Maximum (Max) andAverage (Avg) Latency inMinutes (Mn) and Seconds (Ss) expressed asMn:Ss.
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FIGURE 8 Probability for commit-validity
Table 3 summarises the minimum, maximum and average of the 200 latency values experienced by individual processes. We
observe that the largest 퐸푖 is experienced by 푃2 and stands at 4 minutes and 36.880 seconds. The corresponding upper bound
estimate (when 푦 = |Π|) is 2 (훼+훽 + 훿) = 2×240.324 = 480.648 seconds or 8 minutes 0.648 seconds, which is about twice the
maximum observed. In addition to this large discrepancy between the estimated and observed bounds for퐸푖 (when 푦 = |Π|), we
also observe large differences between the maximum and the average (or minimum) latency in each column. The explanation
for this lies in the shape of graphs in Figures 5, 6 and 7: the largest data point ends up deciding the estimate 푏 ∈ {훼, 훽, 훿}
and is substantially larger than most frequently occurring data points. For example, as noted earlier, the largest awareness delay
observed in Fig 5 is 115.734 seconds which determines 훼; 0.2훼 = 23.147 is still larger than the average awareness delay observed
(13.455 seconds) and 0.4훼 = 46.294 > 30.461, the median. Similarly, in the experiments for 훽 in Fig 6, the peak value of
118.800 seconds was observed in experiment 28 and was adopted as 훽. Only in two other experiments, the block entry delay
came close to 훽 and in the rest it was below 50% of 훽, with the minimum observed delay being 2.355 seconds.
6.4 Impact of Synchrony Violations on Commit-Validity
We observed in § 6.3.1 that 퐸푖 is the largest when 퐶 does not crash and 푦 < |Π|: 퐸푖 = Δ+훼+ 훽. This is because all 푃푖 that vote
yes are forced to wait until 푇푖+Δ before they could launch 푇푋푉푖 which then causes BC to compute and display the verdict. Anyattempt to reduce 퐸푖 in this worst case and also in other cases, and thus to speed up 2PC execution in general, requires using
smaller values for Δ, 훼 and 훽; this calls for less conservative estimation of 훼, 훽 and 훿 as Δ is a function of these delay bound
estimates. Deliberately under-estimating delay bounds, however, tends to increase the scope for synchrony violations. We also
noted in § 5.3 that synchrony violations risk only the commit-validity requirement not being met, leading to unwarranted aborts.
We will here evaluate the probability of commit-validity being met as synchrony violations are permitted to occur due to delay
bounds being deliberately under-estimated.
Recall that when 휔 is considered small compared to (훼 + 훽 + 훿), the Phase 2 timeout Δ = 푚푎푥{(훼 + 훽 + 훿), 휔} + (훼 + 훽 + 훿)
(defined in § 4.3.4) simply becomes 2(훼 + 훽 + 훿); Phase 1 timeout (see § 4.3.3), (훼 + 훽 + 훿), becomes Δ∕2.
Suppose that each bound estimate 푏 ∈ {훼, 훽, 훿} is chosen not as the largest data point observed (as in conservative estimations)
but as푚 times the largest data point, where푚 is a small positive real number.When 0 < 푚 < 1, Phase 1 and Phase 2 timeouts drop
to 푚Δ∕2 and 푚Δ respectively and execution latency is reduced; in our experiments, commit-validity is upheld in an execution
only if 퐷푖 < 푚Δ∕2 and 퐸푖 < 푚Δ for all 푃푖 ∈ Π. For any given 푋 = 푚Δ, the probability of commit-validity being upheld is the
fraction of 200 experiments in which 퐷푖 < 푋∕2 and 퐸푖 < 푋 for all 푃푖 ∈ Π.
Figure 8 depicts the cumulative distributive function for commit-validity for 푋 = 푚Δ with 푚 ranging from 0.03 to 1.12.
(Absolute values of푋 are in the first row of 푥-axis as Minutes:Seconds.) We observe that when푋 is as small as 0.25Δ, commit-
validity is upheld with a probability as high as 82%. What this means here is that choosing 푏 ∈ {훼, 훽, 훿} to be 25% of the largest
data point observed leads only to 18% of runs suffering unwarranted aborts while it can reduce 2PC execution latency by 75%.
Further, the commit-validity probability rises quickly to 98% for푚 as small as 0.44 and it becomes 100% for푚 ≥ 0.75. The latter
indicates that 2PC execution latency can be reduced by 25% without suffering any unwarranted aborts. All these observations
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suggest that (i) small under-estimations of delay bounds may not lead to unwarranted aborts at all, and (ii) there is much room
for reducing execution latency considerably at the expense of a modest increase in unwarranted aborts.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Common choices to avoid 2PC blocking are to use a decentralised protocol12,13 or the (centralised) 3 phase commit. These
alternatives extract a larger message cost even in the absence of crashes and do not have the structural simplicity of 2PC. We
have shown here that the message cost and implementation difficulties of existing 2PC alternatives can be avoided if the 2PC
coordinator 퐶 simply offloads coordination responsibilities to a blockchain after disseminating database work to servers. Our
proposed protocol maintains the low message overhead and the elegant structure of 2PC: those servers that want to commit look
up to the crash-free blockchain for progress (instead of crash-prone퐶) and launch at most two blockchain transactions (instead of
periodically pinging the crashed 퐶 until it recovers). The extra cost arises in two forms: miners’ fees and latency sacrifice when
a public blockchain is used; the former are very small in fiat currencies but the latter can be substantial, in the order of hundreds
of seconds as shown by our experiments involving the Ethereum blockchain. We believe that the performance slowdown will
not be so serious, if permissioned blockchains had been used and our future work would focus on such an investigation.
Though the blockchain infrastructure maintains the abstraction of a reliable state machine with an immutable audit trail
display, such features are not sufficient to guarantee non-blocking atomic commit, unless it meets synchrony requirements. This
is another important contribution of this paper which should be borne in mind when building applications similar to atomic
commit using blockchain. For example, eVoting, like atomic commit, can be guaranteed to be correct only if the blockchain is
synchronous; this aspect is not emphasised but is simply assumed in some blockchain based eVoting systems22. Informally, the
total number of ‘yes’ votes cast is counted in both applications and the count is displayed in eVoting whereas it is used to decide
between commit and abort in atomic commit. Since a dishonest participant can seek to undermine the result of eVoting, it is
important for an eVoting system to specify timing requirements to distinguish between a ‘timely’ vote that gets counted and the
one that arrives ‘too late’ and gets ignored. This naturally leads to synchrony requirements for correctness.
We have applied the traditional ‘best effort, worst-case’ method to reliably estimate delay bounds.We then emulated synchrony
violations by deliberately choosing to use smaller values as bound estimates and thereby examined the extent of commit-validity
violations resulting in unwarranted aborts. We observe the number of unwarranted aborts occurred to be small even when bound
under-estimations are considerable. For example, a uniform reduction of 81% across all bound estimates still upholds commit-
validity (i.e., zero aborts) in more than 50% of runs (푋 = 0.19Δ in Fig 8). This is because the peak delays observed during bound
estimation are much larger than the average or median delays. So, the ‘worst-case’ bound estimation offers built-in tolerance
for synchrony violations. Its down-side, however, is that the protocol takes much longer to terminate. Thus, there is a trade-off
between reducing protocol latency and using smaller than ‘worst-case’ bound estimates which risks violating commit-validity.
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